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Condorcet.vote Alpha
Security & cryptography

Ballot secrecy.
Verifiable results.

Security rests on two complementary pillars: an auditable trusted third party and a cryptographic protocol that runs partly in your browser. Three reading levels, from the simplest to the most technical.

Pillar 1

An auditable trusted third party

An independent, open, inspectable infrastructure, trusted while the vote takes place, verifiable by anyone afterwards.

Pillar 2

An end-to-end protocol

Ballot confidentiality and public verifiability of the count, guaranteed simultaneously by cryptography.

Level 1 · The essentials

What you need to know.

Anonymous by default

By default, the public register lets no one, today or later, link a ballot to a voter. One caveat: in a near-empty signing group, the organizer could guess a choice. A non-anonymous voting option exists for elections that are attributable by nature (co-ownership boards, general meetings).

Verifiable

Anyone can check that the count is correct and that no ballot has been altered.

Ring signature

Your ballot is signed on behalf of a whole group of voters: the signature proves it comes from one of them, without revealing which.

Blockchain

Ballots are published in a blockchain: a signed, hash-chained ledger where any rewrite can be detected by anyone who keeps a copy.

Level 2 · In practice

How it works.

You do not need to be a cryptographer. Here is the essential path a ballot follows.

  1. 01 · Signing

    Everything happens in the browser

    The ballot is signed on the voter’s side, by a Rust cryptographic module compiled to WebAssembly, before anything is sent. The voting secret key is never sent back to the platform, and in “bring your own key” mode, it never even existed anywhere other than on the voter’s device.

    Technical docs Signed ballot
  2. 02 · Anonymity

    A ring signature

    The ballot is signed on behalf of a ring of keys belonging to authorized voters (a bLSAG variant over Ristretto255). The signature establishes that its author is one of those voters; it does not say which. This is the default behavior. If the organizer enables non-anonymous voting, the ballot additionally embeds the voter ID in its signed payload. It then becomes publicly attributable, and the voter is told before voting.

    Technical docs Signed ballot
  3. 03 · Uniqueness

    A “key image” per election

    Each signature carries a unique fingerprint tied to the election. It makes a double vote detectable without ever learning who voted.

    Technical docs Public register
  4. 04 · Verifiability

    A public register distributed as a blockchain

    Ballots are published in a pseudonymous register distributed as a blockchain: signed blocks (OpenPGP v6, Ed25519) linked by hashes. The frozen list of votes is the guarantee: anyone can recount and verify. Each block is also timestamped in the Bitcoin blockchain via OpenTimestamps, a proof of prior existence independent of the platform.

    The blockchain, explained Technical docs Blockchain Technical docs Verification procedure
Scope and limits

The limits we accept.

Every choice aims for a balance: staying accessible to everyone, with no account and nothing to install, while guaranteeing strong cryptographic properties and a solid platform. Here is what this balance leads us not to promise.

Trusted third party at vote time

While the vote is running, you have to trust the platform: for instance, it sees each voter's connection when their ballot arrives. It is open and auditable, but cryptography alone does not remove the need for that trust. The “bring your own key” mode further reduces what you have to entrust to it.

Technical docs Trusted platform

Coercion resistance

With their voting key, every voter can, if they choose, prove that a published ballot is theirs, and so show how they voted. That is what lets them check it was counted. But someone could also demand that proof, through pressure or for money: this version does not protect against that risk.

Technical docs Vote proof

No mix-net

A mix-net hands the shuffling of ballots to several independent organizations. Almost impossible to set up for an association or a general meeting, it would also limit what can be offered, starting with Condorcet voting. Here, anonymity comes from the ring signature.

Technical docs Signed ballot
Level 3 · References

Down to the foundations.

Protocol white paper The complete protocol: cryptography, public register, threat model, trade-offs. In English (reference version) and in French. Français (PDF) ↓ English (PDF) ↓
Independent review An external audit of the protocol and its implementation, including the bLSAG variant, is planned; the report will be published here. Coming soon
Open source: code anyone can read The cryptography and the tally run on open libraries, published and open to inspection by anyone. See the open-source building blocks For experts: the technical documentation The protocol specifications and the verification procedure, check by check, for verifiers and auditors. Open the technical documentation

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